F
ORMER HOUSE SPEAKER Tip O'Neil's adage that "all politics are local" underscores the importance of local governments in American life. The strong role of states in determining what local governments can and cannot do may lead to the assumption that states actually create local governments. For the most part, however, this is not the case. Most state rules delineate the conditions and procedures for creating local units (e.g., cities or special districts) and the powers those units will possess. Basically, state rules create incentives and disincentives for citizens to form local units. When new jurisdictions are formed, the newly created cities or special districts do not simply fill a gap in the existing system of local governments. Instead, new jurisdictions are overlaid atop existing local governments, each with its own set of powers and duties. Increasingly, these new jurisdictions are special districts, a relatively rare form of local government before the 1950s (Stephens and Wikstrom 1998) . 1 Although the academic debate over whether fragmented or consolidated systems result in better substate governance has been long and lively, it has not led to the development of a theoretical framework that explains why special districts or other forms of local government are more likely to arise in some states
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than in others (Table 1 shows special-district formation by state). This article proposes and tests such a framework, focusing on the role of state laws and local actors and accounting for differences in both place and time. Since state laws direct local governments and provide incentives for local actors to create new governments, a better understanding of the part these laws play in special-district formation may aid in developing more informed state intergovernmental policy.
Factors That Influence the Likelihood of Special-District Formation State Institutions
Taken together, state grants and restrictions of local powers (referred to here as state institutions) provide a basic code of local governance that varies substantially from one state to the next (Parks and Oakerson 1989) . This code may either prompt or check the formation of new special districts. Whether state rules spur or stall the formation of new jurisdictions partly depends on the powers that states already have ceded to existing local governments. Empirical studies generally suggest that state constraints on general-purpose local governments prompt the creation of more special districts (MacManus 1981; Bollens 1986; Nelson 1990; Feiock and Carr 1999) . State-imposed fiscal limits that restrict general-purpose local governments' ability to tax, spend, or borrow are likely to lead to the creation of special districts. The general hypothesis has been that when states constrain their cities' ability to raise revenue from property taxes, new, independent special districts are formed as a way around the limits. This notion is not always confirmed by empirical studies (Foster 1997; Burns 1994) . Studies of fiscal restrictions' effects often concentrate on a single kind of restriction (such as a property tax-rate limit) imposed on a single kind of local government, usually cities (MacManus 1981; Nelson 1990 ). However, multiple restrictions (such as state limits on both property tax rates and assessment increases) can have a binding effect on a government's fiscal powers that a single restriction lacks (Joyce and Mullins 1991) . State limits on local debt or spending would also likely stimulate the creation of special districts. In addition, when states restrict only their cities' fiscal powers, their counties may assume more urban service responsibilities. However, when both cities' and counties' fiscal powers are limited, the ability to meet service demands through general-purpose local governments dwindles. The state code that most severely limits local fiscal powers would be that which imposes the most limitations on both cities and counties. If the restricted powers theory holds, the more severely a state constrains its cities' and counties' powers to tax, spend, or borrow, the more likely it is that new special districts will be formed in the state. GPO, 1972 GPO, , 1977 GPO, , 1982 GPO, , 1987 GPO, , 1992 .
State grants of additional fiscal power to their cities or counties may also influence the creation of new special districts. Many states grant cities or counties the power to impose sales or income taxes as well as the power to tax property. Access to an additional tax base may strengthen general-purpose local governments' ability to meet service demands without establishing new special districts. This untested notion is essentially the flip side of the restricted powers argument: if states grant their general-purpose local governments more fiscal powers, fewer new special districts should emerge.
Other state fiscal practices may offer direct inducements that spark the creation of special districts. Special districts in many states are authorized to tax property, and many states provide intergovernmental aid to special districts (ACIR 1964; 1993; 1994; 1995; U.S. Department of Commerce 1972; 1977; 1982; 1987; 1992) . States proffering increased support to special districts, by either granting tax power or providing aid, may find that this practice serves as an incentive for those who would gain from the creation of new units (i.e., public entrepreneurs) to establish new districts.
Among general-purpose local governments, states delineate their counties' boundaries but both grant and constrain the territorial powers of cities. These powers establish the conditions for incorporating new cities and, once created, for expanding their boundaries through annexation. Territorial powers are important because cities' powers of self-rule mean that within their delineated boundaries, independent authority exists to undertake actions such as regulating land use and raising revenue through taxing, charging fees, or incurring debt. Unlike counties, cities have considerable discretion about the nature and level of services they provide within their boundaries. Presumably, the easier it is to incorporate a new city, or the stronger a city's annexation powers, the less likely it is that new special districts will be demanded as service providers (ACIR 1993; Bollens 1986; MacManus 1981) . This finding may not hold when counties' powers are considered. Counties traditionally have served as administrative arms of the state, responsible for carrying out functions such as the maintenance of records or the administration of justice (Cigler 1995) . However, some states have given counties home rule powers to increase their ability to provide services to urbanizing areas outside cities (Berman 1997) . State restrictions on local government powers are embodied in Dillon's Rule, which, in general, holds that local government authority must be granted by the state constitution or by legislative act (ACIR 1964) . Home rule authority is perhaps the broadest state grant of local power, because it allows the empowered government to address many local issues without specific state authorization or interference.
The substance of home rule provisions varies considerably among the states, but nearly all states provide a measure of home rule authority to at least some of their cities. States differ, however, in whether they make home rule provisions for counties (ACIR 1993) . Counties with broad home rule authority are more autonomous and, in that sense, more powerful than those lacking home rule powers. When counties have home rule authority, they may be more able to meet citizen service demands or to check the influence of public entrepreneurs, which decreases the likelihood of new special-district formation.
Public Entrepreneurs
The degree to which states grant or restrict local powers establishes the incentive structure that makes forming a local government attractive to organizations and individuals (North 1990) . New special districts do not spontaneously spring up in response to incentives or to citizen demands for more services. Mass service demand may be latent, and citizens may face collective action problems in trying to address common needs (Olson 1965) . Individuals must act for change to occur. Public entrepreneurs have been cast as agents of institutional change who discover unmet needs, respond to incentives, andwhen successful-"replace the status quo with a new institutional arrangement, and collect above normal profits" (Schneider and Teske 1995, 43) .
Public entrepreneurs-including those who work in universities, civic associations, government, and business-have been identified as having an interest in changing the existing local structure for delivering services (Marando 1974; Fleischmann 1986 ). But the interested groups differ in their motives for institutional change and in the resources they can muster to bring about change. Developers have been singled out as possessing the self-interested incentives as well as the resource advantages needed to foster the creation of special districts.
Special districts have been cited as furthering the agendas of economic elites, particularly those involved in real estate development (Piven and Friedland 1984; Henriques 1986; Vogel and Swanson 1989) . Case studies suggest a strong role for developers and other business interests in local politics, because these governments pursue economic policies that foster the interests of the governing regime (Stone 1987) . Special districts' independent fiscal powers may enable developers to provide infrastructure and other improvements that increase land value while institutionalizing developers' risk (ACIR 1964) . Empirical assessments of the effects of developers on the creation of local governments tend to treat real estate developers as a homogenous interest group, and findings of developers' effects on district formation differ (Foster 1997; Burns 1994) . The development industry is diverse, however, and different categories of developers may differ in their preferences for creating special districts.
The first group, general building contractors, would be expected to act as public entrepreneurs, because new special districts may subsidize the cost of the infrastructure their developments require. These real estate developers may benefit from the creation of a special district, but their profitability does not depend on its creation. The second group, heavy construction contractors, are developers that build infrastructure. Their interests are more straightforward. Many new special districts provide services such as water supply, sanitation, and sewerage or housing and community development that require them to finance infrastructure construction. New special districts can mean additional clients to this second set of developers. For infrastructure developers, special districts are "bread and butter"; for real estate developers, special districts are "gravy."
Demand for Services
The simplest rationale for creating special districts is that citizens demand services. Burns (1994) finds that special districts provide many services (such as soil conservation and mosquito abatement) not typically offered by cities. Increasingly, however, special districts offer the kinds of services that cities once provided. Table 2 shows the services most often provided by new special districts.
The service-demand explanation posits a laissez-faire market of governmental formation in which local governments are supplied in response to citizen demand in much the GPO, 1972 GPO, , 1977 GPO, , 1982 GPO, , 1987 GPO, , 1992 . Notes: Only those functions that increased in number from 1972 to 1992 and are consistently reported by the census bureau across all time periods are included. Because of these restrictions, not all of the functions provided by special districts are covered, and the percentages do not total 100.
same way that new businesses arise to meet shifts in consumer demand (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961) . Local governments are portrayed as vehicles for providing the services that area citizens want, and factors that affect the demand for services (such as population, urbanization, or income levels) affect the creation of local governments (ACIR 1993) . According to Wagner's Law (a demand-side theory), increases in public spending are tied to the transition from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrialized society. Services once provided on an individual basis had to be produced collectively by the public sector. The need for public provision of services then translates into a need for public-sector providers. Thus, increased urbanization would lead to increased special-district formation.
The demand for services increases with population, because more people require more services. Changes in state population would be expected to affect the demand for services and, consequently, the demand for special districts to supply those services; therefore, the more state population grows, the more new districts are needed. Income should have similar effects. Some services that are deemed relative luxuries when personal incomes are low become increasingly desired and marginally more affordable as incomes rise (Berry and Lowery 1987) . If special districts arise in response to service demand, growth in income should increase the probability of specialdistrict formation.
Approach
To assess this framework, these hypotheses are tested for all the contiguous states, except Tennessee, where some of the data were not available. Special-district data for the states are gathered every five years by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, making the domain for each observation a five-year period. The census counts only independent special districts and excludes those that are administratively or financially tied to general-purpose local governments. As a result, the creation of special districts in a state truly represents the addition of new, independent local governments. Four time periods are included, beginning in 1977 and ending in 1992.
Combined regional-and-time-effects Poisson analysis is used to estimate the model. This approach is used because the dependent variable, the number of new special districts, accounts for a relatively rare occurrence that can only take on whole number values. Although there may be no new districts formed in a state, there cannot be a negative number of new districts or partial formation of a new district. These characteristics are typical of event counts (King 1989a; 1989b; Burns 1994) . For data of this type, Poisson analysis, which adapts to a panel design, is superior to traditional ordinary least squares regression (Fox and Lee 1996) . To control for cross-sectional variation, regional dummy variables were used. To control for temporal effects, a dummy variable was included for three of the four time periods covered. Separate estimations were made to determine whether regional and time effects improve the model's explanatory power. The results of likelihood ratio tests (King 1989b ) substantiate the notion that both time period and region significantly affect the formation of special districts among the states. The analysis reports only the combined regional-and-time-effects models.
3 Table 3 highlights major factors that have influenced the formation of special districts before, during, and after the tax revolt of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when state institutions were believed to be influencing the creation of local governments. The strength and direction of any relationship over both space and time help to explain generally the role of state rules, public entrepreneurs, and service demand in affecting the probability that new districts will be formed in a state.
Analysis
The results provide at least some support for each of the three explanations. First, the analy- 
Log likelihood ‫722.2534מ‬
Notes: Census data are used to calculate the number of new special districts in each state and the extent of state financial support to special districts. Data on tax and expenditure limits are from ACIR (1995). The home rule, debt limitations, annexation, and municipal incorporation data are from ACIR (1993). The information on state authorization of local sales or income taxes is from ACIR (1994) . When the ACIR data showed that one of these institutions had been either adopted or deleted during the study period, the annotated statutes of the relevant state were checked to determine the year in which the change had occurred.
sis reinforces the notion that special-district creation is driven by demand for services. As predicted, special districts are more apt to spring up in growing states, with the probability of district creation increasing as state population increases. Second, the probability of special-district creation increases with growth in per capita personal income, supporting the notion that more districts are formed as state populations become more affluent. Third, special districts are more likely to arise in more urbanized states. Taken together, these findings suggest that new special districts are more likely to emerge in states with expanding populations or increasingly affluent residents. It is arguable whether states can control the factors that influence service demand, but states do create their institutions. The empirical results generally substantiate the idea that state rules influence the creation of special districts. State restrictions on generalpurpose local governments tend to lead to the formation of special districts. State limits on cities' and counties' fiscal authorityin the form of either tax and expenditure limits (TELs) or debt limits-generally increase the likelihood that more special districts will appear in the state. As anticipated, the more tax and expenditure limitations states impose on their cities and counties, the greater the probability that special districts will be formed, confirming a widely held yet rarely tested belief about the impact of TELs. Debt limits perform similarly, but the role of debt limits is not as clear-cut as the role of tax and spending limits.
When states specify the purposes for which general-purpose governments can incur debt, the likelihood that special districts will arise increases, consistent with expectations. Presumably, special districts are formed as a mechanism for funding projects and services that other general-purpose governments cannot (perhaps because the projects' purposes are beyond those explicitly allowed by state law). This finding parallels Stephens and Wikstrom's conclusion (1998) that special districts are of greater importance in states whose general-purpose local governments are less active in service provision and suggests that state rules may be partially responsible for this trend.
In states that mandate referendum approval for city and county debt, the public may be accustomed to exercising opportunities for voice (Hirschman 1970) in local borrowing decisions. In these states, special districts may actually be disadvantaged by their relative political invisibility. Special districts are designed to pursue their specialized functions as neutrally competent entities outside the tousle of local politics (Doig and Mitchell 1992) , and they typically offer fewer opportunities for popular participation than cities or counties. When state institutions require popular ratification of local borrowing decisions, the public may view special districts with suspicion. Instead, the public may prefer to receive services from general-purpose local governments, which at least give a greater illusion of popular control.
Other state grants of local fiscal power point to more complex relationships among cities, counties, and special districts. Vertical intergovernmental relations (that is, state authorizations and restrictions of their generalpurpose local governments) set the tone for horizontal intergovernmental relations within the state. In states that authorize their counties but not their cities to raise revenues from either sales or income taxes, special districts are less likely to arise. In states that empower their cities but not their counties to tax either income or sales, however, special-district formation is apt to occur. When both cities and counties are authorized to tax either sales or income, the probability that special districts will be formed in the state increases.
These differences in the effect of fiscal power may be due to economic concerns or to political incentives arising from governmental structure. Differences in tax structure or tax levels are widely believed to affect economic development (Dye and Feiock 1995; Peterson 1981) . When counties have greater tax power relative to cities, they may be in a financial position to support services that would otherwise be provided by special districts, thereby precluding the need for new jurisdictions. Because the tax is at the county and not the city level, differential effects on economic development would be lessened.
In terms of political structure, counties may have an easier time raising taxes than cities, because counties typically lack a single executive (Cigler 1995) . Because of counties' executive fragmentation, officials may be less concerned about making unpopular decisions (such as enacting taxes), because the action is not traced to a lone decision maker. Voters are then less able to "punish" county officials at the polls. Having additional tax authority to provide services either countywide or to unincorporated areas heightens the service-delivery role of counties-a fact that may appeal to politically ambitious county officials.
When states give cities but not their counties income tax power, they create incentives for people and businesses to locate outside municipal boundaries. In these cases, special districts may be needed to provide services without levying or increasing an unpopular tax. City politics often lead politically ambitious leaders to spend-to pursue economic development and produce bricks-and-mortar evidence of their accomplishments (Tao and Feiock 1999) . If these political goals can be realized by creating new special districts, rather than by raising income taxes, city leaders can claim the credit without paying the bill.
When states grant both cities and counties the power to tax either income or sales, they level the fiscal playing field between their general-purpose local governments and even out incentives to their city and county political leaders. When cities and counties have equivalent tax powers, new special-district formation may be seen simply as an expedient way to respond to differing service demands throughout the state. Special-district boundaries can conform to the geography of service demand rather than the boundaries of the existing local governments.
The fiscal powers states grant special districts relative to their general-purpose governments also influence the establishment of new districts. As expected, the higher the percentage of state aid awarded to special districts, the higher the probability that new districts will arise in the state. In addition, when special districts claim a larger share of property taxes collected by cities, counties, and special districts, new districts are more likely to be formed in the state. Direct state aid and state grants of fiscal power to special districts appear to serve as incentives to establish more special-purpose governments.
In terms of territorial powers, the more states limit their cities' ability to annex lands, the greater the likelihood that special districts will be formed, which is consistent with theory. In states with more restrictive annexation limits, special districts may be used to provide services. However, population limits for incorporation diminish the likelihood that special districts will emerge. Population limits do not necessarily check the creation of cities (Rigos and Spindler 1991) , and municipalities may continue to be created to meet citizen demands, which depresses the demand for special districts.
Finally, special-district creation is less likely in states in which counties have home rule. In 1992, 60 percent of all special districts in the United States had a service area wholly within a single county, not coterminous with another local government (Foster 1997) , which suggests that most districts serve residents of unincorporated areas. Apparently, however, a state's grant of home rule authority negates the need to form new special districts, perhaps because counties in these states are able to assume a greater role in providing services to residents.
The results also confirm the notion that developers act as public entrepreneurs in promoting the creation of new special districts. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that different kinds of developers have very different effects on the creation of special districts. As expected, when there are more infrastructure developers, the probability of special-district formation increases; when there are more general contracting firms, the likelihood drops. Developers as public entrepreneurs seem to respond differently to the incentive structures found in state rules.
As developers of infrastructure, heavy construction firms have immediate incentives to promote the formation of new local governments that have the capacity to finance improvements. Special districts are generally less rule bound and less subject to public scrutiny than are cities (Leigland 1992) . Special districts' reputation for both administrative and financial capability suggests that these governments are able to act relatively quickly in fulfilling their function. These qualities would make special districts particularly appealing to this group of public entrepreneurs.
By contrast, the number of general developers may depress the chance of special-district creation, precisely because these developers' interests are already well served by existing local political arrangements. When the interests of general developers are strongly represented in the regimes of existing local governments, establishing new governments creates uncertainties, particularly when developers build in more than one jurisdiction. The layering of additional local governments onto existing ones may threaten current, known procedures for land development or development approval, imposing increased transaction costs while promising unknown benefits. For this group of entrepreneurs, if extant cities and special districts satisfy their interests, new jurisdictions may offer more complications than advantages.
Conclusion
The formation of a new local government affects more than just its residents. The creation of special districts means that within delineated boundaries, separate authority exists to undertake actions such as taxing, spending, charging fees, or incurring debt. This separate authority allows for the differential delivery of services and creates distinct political economies. Decisions about raising and spending revenues affect businesses and residents within special-district borders as well as those in neighboring communities (Tiebout 1956; Peterson 1981) .
Adding a new special district adds a new government, but it does not necessarily add governmental accountability. Critics charge that special districts are more than simply apolitical: they are undemocratic. Unlike in other local governments, in special districts, residency does not necessarily qualify citizens to participate in district politics. Some special districts restrict voting privileges to those who meet property qualifications (Burns 1994) . Even though all residents may be affected by the district's actions, voting in this form of government can be a privilege, not a right.
Academic interest in discovering why these units are formed has recently been reignited. Foster's work (1997) demonstrates that differences among districts-in terms of their financial powers, function, and geographic scope-affect the political economies of metropolitan areas. Examining the rationales for creating special districts or cities, Burns (1994) notes how the powers of cities may be used to meet service demands in one decade and as a tool for racial exclusion in another. In a sense, my work takes a step back, focusing on the way in which the vertical intergovernmental relations, as expressed in state grants and restrictions of local powers, set the stage for different horizontal relationships among the states' cities, counties, and special districts.
It seems unlikely that states would intentionally foster the establishment of multiple special-purpose governments that can have such a widespread effect on the political economy-but that is the effect of many state policies. When state policy prompts the formation of special districts, the structure of local governance is changed radically. These entities-with their authority (among other things) to raise revenue, spend, and borroware added to the mix of local governments. They may improve or impede the accountability, responsiveness, efficiency, economy, or equity of local service delivery. Whatever their effect, their creation is a permanent, significant byproduct of state policy. The final irony may be that exogenous rules such as tax and expenditure limits, which are intended in part to limit governmental growth (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) , may actually lead to an increased propensity to create more local governments. 1972; 1977; 1982; 1987; 1992) . 2. The results of the Poisson regression make it possible to assess whether an explanatory variable increases, decreases, or does not affect the likelihood of special-district creation. 3. Results of the other models, as well as additional information about data sources and measurement, are available from the author.
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